Failure of the democratisation process and regional crisis – Shaba (Katanga)

Mapping Report > Section I. Inventory of the most serious violations > CHAPTER I. March 1993 – June 1996: Failure of the democratisation process and regional crisis > A. Shaba (Katanga)

For over a century, a sizeable community from the Kasai provinces had settled in Katanga87 to construct the railway at the request of the Belgian colonial authorities and work in the mines. With the exception of the secession period (1960-1963), the natives of Katanga88 and the natives of the Kasai provinces89 had always lived in harmony. Under the regime of President Mobutu, however, the Katangese felt politically marginalised and criticised the Kasaians for taking up too many jobs and management positions, in particular in the largest mining firm, Gécamines. 90 After the political liberalisation of the regime, most Kasaian and Katangese delegates to the National Sovereign Conference (CNS) united under the opposition front known as the “Sacred Union” to overthrow President Mobutu. In November 1991, however, President Mobutu managed to get Katangese delegates from the Union of Federalists and Independent Republicans (UFERI) to split with the Sacred Union’s main party, the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS) led by Étienne Tshisekedi.

Following this change of alliance, the president of UFERI, Nguz Karl-i-Bond, became Prime Minister; the party’s provincial president, Kyungu wa Kumwanza, was appointed Governor of Shaba and relations between the Kasaians and the Katangese began to seriously deteriorate. While in Kinshasa, Étienne Tshisekedi and Nguz Karl-i-Bond were fighting for control of the CNS, in Shaba, Governor Kyungu wa Kumwanza had begun to demonise UDPS and its supporters. As UDPS was very popular among the Kasaians in Shaba and Étienne Tshisekedi himself hailed from Kasai Oriental, the political conflict between UFERI and UDPS took on a tribal dimension. For months, Kyungu wa Kumwanza accused the Kasaians of opposing Nguz Karl-i-Bond’s Government so they could continue dominating the Katangese. Blaming them for the majority of the province’s problems, he called on the Katangese to expel them. At his instigation, many young Katangese enlisted in UFERI’s youth wing, JUFERI,91 where they received paramilitary training inspired by Mayi-Mayi rites.92

The first attacks on Kasaian civilians by members of the JUFERI militia took place in late 1991 and early 1992 in the towns of Luena, Bukama, Pweto, Kasenga, Fungurume and Kapolowe. In the first half of 1992, Kyungu wa Kumwanza dismissed many Kasaians from the courts, the education sector, hospitals, state-owned companies, sports associations, state media and the administration. In several towns, Kasaian traders could no longer access public markets and, in many areas, JUFERI prohibited them from farming the land. After the election of Étienne Tshisekedi by the CNS to the post of prime minister on 15 August 1992, the tension mounted. At Lubumbashi, JUFERI youths looted Kasaian homes before being overpowered by the army, the FAZ (Forces armées zaïroises), in bloody clashes. In the days that followed, Kyungu wa Kumwanza and Nguz Karl-i-Bond accused the Kasaians of insulting the Katangese at gatherings held to celebrate the election of the UDPS leader to the Premiership. Likening the Kasaians to insects (“Bilulu” in Swahili), they called on the Katangese people to eliminate them.

Starting in August 1992, JUFERI members attacked Kasaians at Luena, Kamina, Kolwezi, Sandoa and Likasi. From September to November 1992, JUFERI carried out a campaign of persecution and forced displacement against the Kasaians in Likasi, in collusion with the local and provincial authorities. The violence resulted in dozens of civilian victims and saw hundreds of dwellings looted and many buildings destroyed, including places of worship. In a few months, almost 60,000 civilians – almost half the Kasaian population of Likasi – had taken refuge in the train station and in high schools waiting for peace to be restored or for a train to take them away from the town. In the same period, JUFERI carried out similar yet smaller-scale attacks on Kasaians living in the mining town of Kipushi.

On 20 February 1993, at a meeting held in the Place de la Poste at Kolwezi, Governor Kyungu wa Kumwanza urged the Katangese to drive the Kasaians out of Gécamines and take over the management positions in the firm. Beginning on 20 March 1993, members of the JUFERI militia organised a campaign of persecution and forced displacement against the Kasaians of Kolwezi, with the support of the gendarmerie and in collaboration with the municipal and provincial authorities. In this context, the Mapping Team documented the following alleged incidents:

  • Having forbidden Kasaian workers from entering Gécamines sites across the town on 23 March, JUFERI units began by killing an unknown number of Kasaian civilians in the outlying districts of Kolwezi, forcing Kasaians to gather in schools and places of worship under the protection of the FAZ. In the Musonoie district, three kilometres from Kolwezi in the direction of Kapata, members of the FAZ from the 14th Brigade, Kamanyola Division, attacked JUFERI youths, who fled. On 24 March, JUFERI received reinforcements from the surrounding villages and imposed a curfew in several districts of the town.93
  • On the morning of 25 March, JUFERI units armed mainly with machetes, knives and fuel cans burst into the homes of Kasaians in different districts of the town of Kolwezi and ordered them to leave immediately or they would be killed and their houses torched. Over the course of that day, JUFERI went on a targeted killing spree aimed at terrorising Kasaians and forcing them to leave Kolwezi. Over50,000 Kasaian civilians fled into the town to take refuge at the train station, the post office, the Hotel Impala, the high school and the convent schools of the Notre-Dame de Lumière cathedral. In the days that followed, JUFERI killed an unknown number of Kasaian civilians at identity checks carried out at roadblocks erected in the town. At least two people were killed by JUFERI with spears or arrows. There was also mention of Kasaian women killed near the Mutshinsenge river.94

From April onwards, a certain degree of calm was restored. Tensions remained, however, between the FAZ 95 and the “Mobiles”96 on the one hand and JUFERI and the gendarmerie on the other.97

  • On 2 May and 4 May, JUFERI units reportedly attacked the camp of Kasaian refoulés98 at the train station in Kolwezi, killing three civilians belonging to the Mobiles group. On 5 May, the Mobiles allegedly retaliated by killing a Katangese civilian who had wandered into the tunnel near the train station.99

In late June 1993, Governor Kyungu wa Kumwanza and the commander of the military region, General Sumaili, pressured the refoulés to leave Kolwezi before 1 July.

  • On 30 June 1993, a high-ranking FAZ officer reportedly set fire to the shelters and tents of the Kasaian refoulés in the train station at Kolwezi. Unable to leave the site fast enough, at least one elderly person and an unknown number of disabled people were burned alive.100

The total number of victims of JUFERI’s campaign of persecution in Kolwezi is hard to determine. According to statistics from the Comité des refoulés de Kolwezi, between 24 March 1993 and 14 January 1994 direct clashes between JUFERI and the Kasaians are thought to have resulted in 371 victims.

According to all the witness accounts gathered, most of the deaths resulting from the campaign of persecution and forced displacement were not so much attributable to direct attacks by JUFERI as the inhumane living conditions imposed by the authorities. According to the Comité des refoulés de Kolwezi, between 24 March 1993 and January 1994 a total of 1,540 Kasaian refoulés died due to lack of food and medicine or as a result of diseases contracted in refoulement sites or on trains transporting them to the Kasai provinces.

  • In the days that followed the attacks of 25 March 1993, dozens of refoulés in a state of shock died for lack of humanitarian aid at their refuge sites. Witnesses gave figures ranging from 7 to 20 deaths each day. Many died as the result of a cholera epidemic. Thanks to aid provided by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Katangese friends, living conditions at refoulement sites improved gradually but infant mortality remained very high.101

Some refoulés managed to leave Kolwezi by road or on foot, but most, for fear of coming up against JUFERI roadblocks, remained near the train station, waiting for a train for the Kasai provinces. After several passenger trains were laid on by Gécamines and religious sisters in April and May 1993, the refoulés had no option but to take goods trains. In October 1993, many sick people and people unfit for travel were airlifted thanks to planes chartered by the Salvatorian Fathers. By 14 January 1994, fewer than 5,000 Kasaians remained in Kolwezi.

  • During their interminable journey to Mwene Ditu, Mbuji-Mayi and Kananga, the refoulés travelled in freight cars, packed in groups of eighty. Several surviving witnesses have likened these trains to “coffins on rails”. Mortality, in particular child mortality, was especially high on these trains. According to the Kolwezi Comité des refoulés, 94 Kasaian civilians are thought to have died on the journey from accidents caused by poor transport conditions. Most of the deaths, however, are thought to have been attributable to overcrowding, stress caused by JUFERI train attacks, disease, lack of water and despair caused by persecutions and the loss of family members and friends. In spite of the presence of the FAZ, who escorted many of the convoys, JUFERI attacked the trains during their journey. As soon as they left Kolwezi, the attackers cut the air supply to the cars or threw petrol bombs on to the trains. At stations where trains were due to stop, in particular at Luena and Kamina, JUFERI members prevented refoulés from getting off to buy food, get treatment or bury those who had died on the journey. A large number of refoulés died during the journey and had to be hastily buried along the railway track. One survivor described it as “the world’s longest graveyard”. Upon their arrival in Mwene Ditu, Kananga and other towns and communities in the Kasai provinces, the refoulés received MSF aid and were taken in charge by CARITAS and OXFAM UK.102

Ultimately, according to the statistics put forward by the Comité des refoulés de Kolwezi, over 130,000 Kasaian civilians were expelled, including over 80,000 children. The campaign of persecution and expulsion at Kolwezi is thought to have caused the deaths of over 300 children. Those who remained were reportedly the target of various acts of persecution and discrimination until at least 1995.

JUFERI’s persecution of civilians of Kasaian origin that began in September 1992 continued into 1993 and 1994 in Likasi.

  • At Likasi, between January and August 1993, JUFERI allegedly resumed its campaign of persecution to force Kasaians still working at Gécamines to leave the town for good. It is hard to determine the total number of deaths resulting from the attacks and diseases contracted at the refoulement sites.103

In 1993, the campaign of persecution carried out by JUFERI against Kasaian civilians since September 1992 continued at Kipushi.

  • The anti-Kasaian movement began in Kipushi on 3 May 1993. On 25 June, 500 members of JUFERI reportedly attacked Kasaian civilians working at Gécamines, preventing them from further access to facilities. The same movement was resumed with greater intensity in late September and led to the deaths of at least three civilians, injuring an unknown number of others and causing much material damage.104

Throughout 1993 and 1994, Governor Kyungu wa Kumwanza stepped up his speeches against Kasaians living in Lubumbashi. In early 1994, he famously declared that having cleaned out the “bedrooms” (Likasi and Kolwezi) he would now see to the “living room”, by which he meant Lubumbashi, the capital of the province. The Kasaians of Lubumbashi lived in terror for months, fearing the same fate as the refoulés of Likasi and Kolwezi. Many were dismissed by major private enterprises and the various public services simply for being Kasaian.

The total number of victims of the campaign of persecution executed by JUFERI and Governor Kyungu wa Kumwanza, in collusion with President Mobutu, is hard to determine. Interviews and documents consulted by the Mapping Team have not been able to confirm the figure of 50,000 deaths put forward by a human rights NGO in 1994.

There is no doubt, however, that several thousand Kasaian civilians lost their lives in the course of these events.

According to data from the NGO Association des refoulés pour le développement du Kasaï (ARKASAI), which worked alongside MSF Belgium and the European Union on refoulé reception, over 780,000 Kasaians were expelled to Kasai Oriental between November 1993 and November 1995. In the same period, around 450,000 Kasaians were received in Kasai Occidental, according to statistics provided by a former OXFAM UK officer. The remaining refoulés settled mainly in Kinshasa. The consequences of this tragedy are still felt more than fifteen years after the events took place. Most of the refoulés live in utter destitution, the Kasaians driven out of Gécamines have never received outstanding pay checks or pensions, the refoulés have never received compensation for their loss and no legal action has been brought against those responsible for this persecution.

From the second half of 1994, the political situation in Kinshasa evolved in a way that was not advantageous for UFERI. Following the institutional agreement forged between the Political Forces of the Conclave and the Sacred Union, Étienne Tshisekedi and Faustin Birindwa were removed from the Premiership and a member of the presidential majority, Kengo wa Dondo, was appointed prime minister. Having no further need for UFERI and Kyungu wa Kumwanza to weaken Étienne Tshisekedi, President Mobutu gradually withdrew his support for them. Against a backdrop of rivalry for the control of various types of illicit traffic (mainly cobalt and stolen vehicles) in the province, the Zairian security services (the FAZ, the Civil Guard, SNIP)105 attacked members of the JUFERI militia in several territories of the province. On 27 March 1995, Governor Kyungu wa Kumwanza was arrested for separatist activities. As a reaction, UFERI declared two days of ville morte on 30 and 31 March 1995. Kyungu wa Kumwanza was discharged from the governorship on 20 April 1995.

  • On 31 March 1995, members of the Civil Guard allegedly opened fire on JUFERI units trying to impose respect of the ville morte days, killing two of them and injuring at least seven others. In the months that followed, the Civil Guard and the SNIP reportedly opened fire on and tortured tens of UFERI and JUFERI members at Lubumbashi, Likasi, Kolwezi, Kambove and Luena.106

87 The province of Katanga was called Shaba from 1971 to 1997.
88 In the text that follows, the natives of Katanga are designated “Katangese”.
89 In the text that follows, the natives of the Kasai provinces are designated “Kasaians”.
90 La Générale des Carrières et des Mines (state-owned mining company).
91 JUFERI was run as a full-blown militia. It comprised several branches, including the Division spéciale Pononai (DSPO), responsible for eliminating the movement’s enemies, the Division spéciale PUMINA, responsible for attacks on the Kasaians (torture, beatings, torching homes, etc.) and the Ninja group, which practised martial arts and was responsible for ensuring the protection of UFERI leaders.
92 In the DRC, the term Mayi-Mayi is used to designate groups of armed combatants resorting to specific magic rituals such as water ablutions (“Mayi” in Swahili) and carrying amulets prepared by witchdoctors, believed to make them invulnerable and protect them from ill fate. Present mainly in South Kivu and North Kivu, but also in other provinces, the various Mayi- Mayi groups included armed forces led by warlords, traditional tribal elders, village heads and local political officers. The Mayi-Mayi lacked cohesion and the different groups allied themselves with various government groups and armed forces at different times.
93 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, January 2009; Kasai Oriental and Kasai Occidental, March–April 2009; La Voix du Centre des droits de l’homme et du droit humanitaire (CDH), No.1, January–February–March 1994.
94 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, January 2009, Kasai Oriental and Kasai Occidental, March–April 2009; Association zaïroise pour la défense des droits de l’homme (AZADHO), Périodique des droits de l’homme, No.5, May–June 1993; Human Rights Watch Africa, Zaire: inciting hatred, June 1993; La Voix du Centre des droits de l’homme et du droit humanitaire (CDH), No.1, January–February– March 1994; Donatien Dibwe Dia Mwembu and Marcel Ngandu Mutombo, Vivre ensemble au Katanga, L’Harmattan, 2005, pp. 378–379.
95 The Katanga-based FAZ included many citizens from other provinces in Zaire and were hostile to JUFERI’s ideology.
96 The “Mobiles” were self-defence groups responsible for protecting expelled Kasaians (French: refoulés).
97 The gendarmerie was predominately Katangese and operated in collaboration with JUFERI.
98 The term refoulés, meaning “displaced people”, is used by Kasaians driven out of Shaba.
99 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, January 2009 and Kasai Oriental and Kasai Occidental, March–April 2009.
100 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, January 2009 and Kasai Oriental and Kasai Occidental, March–April 2009.
101 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, January 2009; Kasai Oriental and Kasai Occidental, March–April 2009; AZADHO, Périodique des droits de l’homme, No.5, May–June 1993.
102 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, January 2009 and Kasai Oriental and Kasai Occidental, March–April 2009.
103 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Katanga, January 2009 and Kasai Oriental and Kasai Occidental, March–April 2009.
104 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Kasai Oriental, April 2009.
105 National intelligence and protection service.
106 See La Voix du CDH, No.7, March–April 1995; AZADHO, Périodique des droits de l’homme, No.19, Annual Report 1995, January 1996; Fédération des droits de l’homme, Rapport succinct au Rapporteur spécial, 20 August 1995.