Natural resource exploitation as a factor in the prolongation of the conflict

Mapping Report > Section II. Specific Acts of Violence > CHAPTER III. Acts of violence linked to natural resource exploitation > C. Natural resource exploitation as a factor in the prolongation of the conflict

The profits from natural resource exploitation were such that, within a short space of time, the war had become self-financing. All the parties to the conflict, including the Congolese Government, raised significant amounts through the natural resource trade, using a variety of means, including formal or semi-formal systems of taxation, licences and fees; extortion at mining sites, roadblocks and borders; and requisitioning of stockpiles of timber and minerals. There were also other more organised systems such as the arrangements set up between the Congolese Government and the parastatals, the creation of front companies and networks set up by the Rwandan and Ugandan armies in collaboration with the RCD and other rebel groups they supported. All these arrangements were documented, in particular by the Panel, and later Group, of Experts1389and will not be expanded upon in this chapter, which is based on the conclusions of these inquiries. The population benefited very little from this natural resource exploitation and the revenues from trafficking of all kinds of goods were used to sustain the war effort or for the personal enrichment of all parties to the conflict.

1. Financing the conflict through natural resource exploitation

In 2002, the Panel of Experts came to the conclusion that all coltan mines in the east of the DRC were benefiting either a rebel group or foreign armies.1390

Ample evidence indicates that Rwanda and Uganda were financing their military expenditure with the profits from natural resource exploitation in the DRC. According to some estimates, the income Rwanda received provided 80% of all the APR’s expenditure in 1999.1391 The Ugandan army also enjoyed a considerably larger budget due to profits from the DRC’s wealth, particularly in the districts of Ituri and Haut-Uélé, from 1998 to 2002.1392 A large part of the gold produced in Ituri was exported through Uganda, then re-exported as if it had been produced domestically – a similar model to that used for diamond exports.1393

The MLC also financed a significant proportion of its war efforts through taxes on exports of tea, coffee, timber and gold coming from Équateur and Orientale provinces.1394 Like other armed groups, and like the Congolese Government, the MLC granted mining concessions on the territories it controlled in exchange for military equipment and other forms of support, primarily from Uganda.1395 Diamonds, which could be easily smuggled to neighbouring countries such as the Central African Republic, were also an important source of finance for the MLC. 1396

Also in Équateur, soldiers from Chad’s national army requisitioned stocks of coffee, particularly in Gemena, and sold them on.1397

2. Contributions of State-owned companies to Kabila’s war effort

State-owned companies, such as MIBA, Gécamines, the gold mining company OKIMO and oil companies, made direct financial contributions to the Government’s war effort.1398 Income from the sale of diamonds was also used to buy arms for the Congolese army and pay the salaries of Zimbabwean army troops.1399

3. Paying back the war debt

The military intervention and political support of certain countries of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) [Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia] was critical to President Laurent-Désiré Kabila during the second war. In order to repay his debt to Zimbabwe, Kabila granted President Robert Mugabe’s Government the rights to significant diamond, copper, cobalt and timber concessions in the DRC. In 2001, the Panel of Experts described Zimbabwe as the most active government ally in terms of the exploitation of natural resources.1400 But it was not only Zimbabwe that was handsomely repaid for its military support. Kabila reportedly also rewarded his other allies, Angola and Namibia, with favourable diamond and oil deals.1401

4. Illegal or unfavourable contracts

The illicit exploitation of natural resources in the DRC and the accompanying serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law could not have taken place on such a large scale had there not been customers willing to trade in these resources. Indeed, there was never any shortage of foreign buyers willing to handle these goods, despite the existence of reports denouncing the serious violations of international law committed by their trading and financial partners. Buyers included not only traders in the DRC and neighbouring countries but also private companies registered in other countries, including multinationals.1402

When the AFDL/APR launched its rebellion in 1996, one of its priorities was to take over and, in many cases, cancel or modify, mining contracts that had been signed by President Mobutu. During the AFDL’s advance on Kinshasa in 1996, before he had even formed a government, Kabila was allocating mining concessions to private companies.1403 Many of these transactions were conducted illegally. The consequences for the country as a whole were serious, as millions of dollars were tied up in these unfavourable contracts for several decades.

During the second war, foreign companies rarely controlled the source of the minerals or other goods they were purchasing, and sometimes paid the armed groups directly.1404 In a number of cases, foreign or multinational companies were directly involved in negotiations with perpetrators of serious human rights abuses, paying armed groups or providing them with facilities or logistics in order to exploit natural resources.1405

5. Links with the arms trade

Trafficking of natural resources in the DRC, particularly during the conflict, was closely intertwined with other criminal networks, in particular those involved in arms trafficking. The Panel of Experts and research institutes have documented some of these links and identified key arms traffickers and trafficking routes.1406 The Panel of Experts concluded that: “It is very difficult to stem or halt illegal exploitation without also tackling the issue of arms trafficking” and highlighted the interconnection between these two activities, the conflict, insecurity and impunity.1407 Connections with these networks enabled the perpetrators of human rights abuses in the DRC to smuggle natural resources out of the country without any difficulty, using the profits to purchase arms and commit yet further human rights abuses. The arms trafficking networks in turn used the same transport network; certain airline companies were known to fly minerals out of, and arms back into, the DRC.1408

See also:

1389 Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the DRC (S/2001/357). Section III B of the report explains how the different parties to the conflict financed the war; IPIS, “Network War: An Introduction to Congo’s Privatised War Economy”, October 2002.
1390 Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the DRC (S/2002/1146), para. 80.
1391 Reports of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the DRC (S/2002/1146, paras. 70 -71 and S/2001/357, para. 127); AI, Our brothers who help kill us: Economic exploitation and human rights abuses in the east, 2003, p 12; Global Witness, “Same Old Story – A Background Study on Natural Resources in the DRC”, June 2004, p 21.
1392 Reports of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the DRC (S/2001/357, paras. 110- 121 and 180 and S/2002/1146, para. 122).
1393 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Orientale Province, January-February 2009; HRW, Ituri. Covered in Blood, 2003, p. 12-13; HRW, The Curse of Gold, 2005, p. 105-111.
1394 Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the DRC (S/2001/357), par. 13; Global Witness, “Same Old Story – A Background Study on Natural Resources in the DRC”, June 2004, p. 36; ICG, ”Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War”, December 2000, pp. 36-35.
1395 Reports of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the DRC (S/2001/357, paras. 122- 123 and S/2002/565).
1396 For more information on relations between the MLC and the RCA with regard to diamond trafficking, see Christian Dietrich, Hard Currency: The Criminalised Diamond Economy of the DRC and its Neighbours, 2002, pp. 21-22 and 41.
1397 Interviews with the Mapping Team, Équateur, April 2009.
1398 Reports of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the DRC (S/2001/357, para. 153 and S/2002/1146, para. 55); AI, “Making a Killing: The Diamond Trade in Government-controlled DRC”, 22 October 2002.
1399 Addendum to the Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the DRC (S/2001/1072), paras. 66-69; Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the DRC (S/2002/1146), para. 54.
1400 Addendum to the Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the DRC (S/2001/1072), para. 14.
1401 ICG, Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War, 2000, p. 57; Christian Dietrich, Hard Currency: The Criminalized Diamond Economy of the DRC and its Neighbours, 2002, pp. 42-44.
1402 See IPIS, Supporting the War Economy in the DRC: European Companies and the Coltan Trade, 2002; Global Witness, Undermining Peace. Tin: the Explosive Trade in Cassiterite in Eastern DRC, 2005, p. 23, and Global Witness, “Complaint to the UK National Contact Point under the Specific Instance Procedure of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises”, 20 February 2007.
1403 IRIN “Emergency Update No. 151 on the Great Lakes”, 16 April 1997; For more information on Kabila’s allocation of concessions to private companies, see Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of the Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the DRC (S/2001/357); Global Witness, Same Old Story – A Background Study on Natural Resources in the DRC, 2004; Dena Montague, “Stolen Goods: Coltan and Conflict in the DRC”, SAIS Review, 2002, pp. 108-111. See also Associated Press, “Angry Businessmen Side with Congo’s Rebels”, 14 September 1998; The Globe and Mail, “Barrick, Anglo Joint Ventures South African Conglomerate to Manage Barrick’s African Mining and Exploration Projects”, 11 May 1998.
1404 Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the DRC (S/2001/357), paras. 47- 54; HRW, The Curse of Gold, 2005.
1405 Greenpeace International, “Carving up the Congo”, April 2007; Global Witness, Same Old Story – A Background Study on Natural Resources in the DRC, 2004; HRW, The Curse of Gold, 2005.
1406 See for example IPIS, Network War: an Introduction to Congo’s Privatised War Economy, 2002.
1407 Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the DRC (S/2001/1072), paras. 46-47.
1408 IPIS, Network War: an Introduction to Congo’s Privatised War Economy, 2002; IPIS, Supporting the War Economy in the DRC: European Companies and the Coltan Trade, 2002. Local airlines operating in North and South Kivu reportedly flew minerals out of and arms back into the country; see AI, Our brothers who help kill us: Economic exploitation and human rights abuses in the east, 2003.